The Old Continent is continuing the transition of its energy policy to reduce its dependence on Russian supplies.
The process is indeed laborious, but it's well underway. Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia supplied nearly 150 billion cubic meters of gas per year to the EU. These volumes have collapsed and now represent only a quarter of pre-war imports.
In 2024, less than 17 billion cubic meters passed through the pipelines—more precisely via TurkStream and destined for Hungary. The bombing of NordStream and the Ukrainian president's decision to permanently shut down the pipelines crossing his territory at the end of 2024 prevent any resumption of these volumes.
Curiously, liquefied natural gas imports increased by 18% in 2024, reaching 24 billion cubic meters, or €22bn in value—the same amount as the EU's military aid to Ukraine.
Against this backdrop, the REPowerEU plan aims to eliminate all Russian gas imports by the end of 2027. To compensate for these lost volumes, LNG imports will have to increase by between 30% and 50% within two years, i.e., between 150 and 250 deliveries.
In metric tons, this additional volume requested by Europe would represent less than 6% of the new capacity that will be brought onto the market by 2028. It should be noted that 40% of this new capacity will be located in the US.
Unsurprisingly, the US president is therefore exerting diplomatic pressure—and, according to a now tried and tested method, blackmailing the EU with customs duties and arbitrary taxes—to ensure that the EU sources its supplies from the US rather than elsewhere.
For Europeans, this formula comes with both progress and risk: progress in the form of contracts that are much more flexible than those that once bound the bloc to Russia; risk in the form of exposure to market volatility, and therefore less visibility and, undoubtedly, higher supply costs.
Much to Donald Trump's chagrin, it is therefore natural that the EU intends to defend a flexible and diversified import strategy, paying particular attention to its partners in the Gulf and the southern Mediterranean.
However, a reasonable compromise should soon be found between allies on both sides of the Atlantic. If the EU stands firm, it will likely be able to negotiate a favorable contractual framework—admittedly not as favorable as the one that once united it with Russia, but one in which it could nevertheless find its place.
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