DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.abl7682
PDF: https://www.science.org/doi/epdf/10.1126/sciadv.abl7682?adobe_mc=MCMID%3D73246005249468380041472861452220386286%7CMCORGID%3D242B6472541199F70A4C98A6%2540AdobeOrg%7CTS%3D1638660732
JACOB T. HEGGESTAD HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0001-5217-6735RHETT J. BRITTON HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0002-2411-3195DAVID S. KINNAMON HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0001-9463-6613SIMONE A. WALLDANIEL Y. JOHANGUS M. HUCKNALLLYRA B. OLSON HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0003-2783-8244JACK G. ANDERSONANNA MAZUR[...]ASHUTOSH CHILKOTI HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0002-1569-2228 Authors Info & Affiliations
Tal Patalon, MD1,2; Sivan Gazit, MD, MA1,2; Virginia E. Pitzer, ScD3,4; et al
doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2021.7382
PDF: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_url?url=https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/articlepdf/2786890/jamainternal_patalon_2021_oi_210077_1637782069.64873.pdf&hl=en&sa=T&oi=ucasa&ct=ufr&ei=T_mrYdTlH7GO6rQPzpCJiAs&scisig=AAGBfm2QxF_f18NX53RH7o-oDOJu17-7iA
Key Points
Question What is the additional reduction in the odds of infection with SARS-CoV-2 in people receiving a third dose (booster) of the BNT162b2 (Pfizer-BioNTech) vaccine compared with those receiving 2 doses?
Findings In this case-control study that included 306 710 Israeli adults 40 years and older, there was an estimated significant reduction in the odds of SARS-CoV-2 infection within a few weeks of receiving the booster compared with receiving just the 2 primary doses. Those receiving the booster also had lower odds of hospitalization.
Meaning The findings of this study suggest that the waning of vaccine-induced protection against SARS-CoV-2 infection seems to be counteracted in the short-term by a third dose and further monitoring is needed to determine the duration of immunity following the booster.
Importance With the evidence of waning immunity of the mRNA vaccine BNT162b2 (Pfizer-BioNTech), a nationwide third-dose (booster) vaccination campaign was initiated in Israel during August 2021; other countries have begun to administer a booster shot as well.
Objective To evaluate the initial short-term additional benefit of a 3-dose vs a 2-dose regimen against infection of SARS-CoV-2.
Design, Setting, and Participants This preliminary retrospective case-control study used 2 complementary approaches: a test-negative design and a matched case-control design. Participants were included from the national centralized database of Maccabi Healthcare Services, an Israeli healthcare maintenance organization covering 2.5 million members. Data were collected between March 1, 2020, and October 4, 2021, and analyses focused on the period from August 1, 2021, to October 4, 2021, because the booster dose was widely administered from August 1 onward.
Exposures Either 2 doses or 3 doses of the BNT162b2 vaccine.
Main Outcomes and Measures The reduction in the odds of a positive SARS-CoV-2 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test at different time intervals following receipt of the booster dose (0-6, 7-13, 14-20, 21-27, and 28-65 days) compared with receiving only 2 doses.
Results The study population included 306 710 members of Maccabi Healthcare Services who were 40 years and older (55% female) and received either 2 or 3 doses of the BNT162b2 vaccine and did not have a positive PCR test result for SARS-CoV-2 prior to the start of the follow-up period. During this period, there were 500 232 PCR tests performed, 227 380 among those who received 2 doses and 272 852 among those who received 3 doses, with 14 989 (6.6%) and 4941 (1.8%) positive test results in each group, respectively. Comparing those who received a booster and those who received 2 doses, there was an estimated odds ratio of 0.14 (95% CI, 0.13-0.15) 28 to 65 days following receipt of the booster (86% reduction in the odds of testing positive for SARS-CoV-2).
Conclusion and Relevance Previous studies have demonstrated that vaccine-derived protection against SARS-CoV-2 wanes over time. In this case-control analysis, we showed an association between receipt of the booster dose and a reduction in the odds of testing positive for SARS-CoV-2, potentially counteracting waning immunity in the short term. Further monitoring of data from this population is needed to determine the duration of immunity following the booster.
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2786890
Klaus Hirschbuehl, Tina Schaller,
Background: The rate of SARS-CoV-2 breakthrough infections in vaccinees is becoming an increasingly serious issue. Objective: To determine the causes of death, histological organ alteration, and viral spread in relation to demographic, clinical-pathological, viral variants, and vaccine types. Design: Comprehensive retrospective observational cohort study. Setting: Consecutive cases from four German academic medical centers. Patients: Deceased with proven SARS-CoV-2 infection after vaccination who died between January and November 2021. Collections of 29 vaccinees which were analyzed and compared to 141 nonvaccinated control cases. Results: Autopsies were performed on 16 partially and 13 fully vaccinated individuals. Most patients were elderly and suffered from several relevant comorbidities. Real-time RT-PCR (RT-qPCR) identified a significantly increased rate of generalized viral dissemination within the organism in vaccinated cases versus nonvaccinated cases (45% vs. 16%, respectively; P = 0.008). Vaccinated cases also showed high viral loads, reaching Ct values below 10, especially in the upper airways and lungs. This was accompanied by high rates of pulmonal bacterial or mycotic superinfections and the occurrence of immunocompromising factors such as malignancies, immunosuppressive drug intake, or decreased immunoglobulin levels. All these findings were particularly accentuated in partially vaccinated patients compared to fully vaccinated individuals. A fatal course after vaccination occurred in only 14% of all COVID-19 deceased in Augsburg. Limitations: Restricted number of cases Conclusions: Fatal cases of COVID-19 in vaccinees were rare and often associated with severe comorbidities or other immunosuppressive conditions. Interestingly, we observed striking virus dissemination in our case study, which may indicate a decreased ability to eliminate the virus in patients with an impaired immune system. However, the potential role of antibody-dependent enhancement must also be ruled out in future studies.
The authors have declared no competing interest.
This work was supported by the German Registry of COVID-19 Autopsies (www.DeRegCOVID.ukaachen.de), funded by the Federal Ministry of Health (ZMVI1-2520COR201), by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research within the framework of the network of university medicine (DEFEAT PANDEMICs, 01KX2021) and the German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture through the Federal Office for Agriculture and Food, project ZooSeq, grant number 2819114019.
https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.12.03.21267155v1
BY DEREK LOWE
I was quite surprised by the efficacy that Merck reported for the viral polymerase inhibitor molnupiravir when those interim trial results were announced in October. But the FDA just held an advisory committee meeting on the drug yesterday (here's Matthew Herper's writeup), and the data that have come in since then are, frankly, unimpressive. Which makes a person think again about the whole risk/benefit balance for the drug.
It's the benefit side that's changed - the risk (as far as we can tell) is about the same. Let's look at three components of it. First off, I do not think that molnupiravir is carcinogenic, as I detailed in this post. Its mutagenic potential has been studied thoroughly, and I believe that it's safe to use as intended (both in its dosages and in its duration of therapy). There is another worry, of course: in Merck's trial they deliberately excluded pregnant women, because (as the world knows) molnupiravir works by disrupting the RNA copying of the coronavirus. Now, DNA copying in human cells is different, but you wouldn't want to find out the hard way that it's not as different as you believed, so I think that caution is warranted. Embryogenesis is exactly where something like that could have the worst effects, and we know how to avoid that risk even though we're not sure how much of a risk it even is.
The third risk factor is that you could cause mutations in the coronavirus, but not enough to make it non-viable, and perhaps even give it some mutations that make it worse as a pathogen. This issue came up during the advisory committee hearing several times. It's a serious question, but for what it's worth, I think odds of this happening are very low indeed. If you look at the sequence maps of where we've been seeing coronavirus mutations so far in the pandemic, you'll note that there are many parts of its genome that have been very quiet. That's not because things don't mutate there - there's no reason to think that there's any intrinsically higher mutation rate in any particular part of the viral sequence. No, that is because mutations in those regions are actually disadvantages, and the resulting viruses don't spread.
It's similar to the famous realization that Abraham Wald came to while looking at the data for military aircraft damage during World War II. Famously, one recommendation had been to add armor to the areas on bomber aircraft that showed damage from fighters and flak, but Wald pointed out the survivorship bias implications: these planes were the ones that actually returned, and the damage they picked up indicated the places where you didn't need armor, because it showed that planes could be hit there and survive. The armor needed to be in the other parts of the planes, because those were the ones where damage sent them down in flames. That's what you're seeing when you look at viral mutation maps: pure, 200-proof survivorship bias. The coronavirus is constantly throwing off mutations of every kind, and the overwhelming majority of those disappear and are never heard from again. I'll have more to say on this in an upcoming post on the omicron variant, so I'll leave this part of the discussion for now.
So those are the risks, as I see them. With the benefit shown in the interim analysis from the MOVe-OUT trial (whose enrollment was stopped for efficacy, remember), molnupiravir looked like a good bet. But what if that benefit isn't as high as it looked like? That's what made the advisory committee vote close (13-10), and it very much complicates the FDA's decision about whether to approve the drug (and under what conditions). Herper's article quotes a committee member saying “I think we need to stop and acknowledge that the whole reason we’re having this discussion is because the efficacy of this product is not overwhelmingly good". The initial results were a 50% relative decrease in hospitalizations in the study's unvaccinated high-risk patients (on an absolute basis, a decrease from 14% hospitalized down to 7%). But the final data showed only a 30% relative decrease, and because the numbers also changed in the control group, the absolute change was only 3% in the end. The advisory committee kept trying to work out how this happened, and it appears that Merck's team really didn't have a good answer, either. But it really makes you think that the interim read was about the rosiest view available, and that the real-world effects are going to be less impressive. I mean, the way those numbers were going, who's to say that this is the floor? And remember, these were patients at higher risk of developing severe disease - what would the benefit look like if you opened the drug up to use by the general population as soon as anyone tested positive?
No, from the way things look, I would say that if the FDA approves the drug that it will only be for high-risk patients, and that there should be a REMS (risk evaluation and mitigation strategy) in place to make sure that it doesn't get into any woman who might become pregnant during the course of treatment. I now think that molnupiravir is far less likely to be useful in (for example) a vaccinated patient with a breakthrough infection, unless they have other risk factors (advanced age, other diseases, and the like). That leaves me pinning more hopes on Pfizer's protease inhibitor - and it also leaves me wondering why there hasn't been a trial started with these two drugs in combination. A lower dose of molnupiravir has the potential to add to the efficacy of the Pfizer drug and perhaps to extend its utility in the face of possible resistance. But it's not happening, and it should.
https://www.science.org/content/blog-post/rethinking-molnupiravir
BY DEREK LOWE
So now we have the Omicron variant to think about. I'm just as glad that I wasn't around to blog on Monday and Tuesday of this week while the news started hitting, because the main useful thing to say was that there wasn't much useful to say yet. That's still largely the case, but we can at least try to get our bearings and get ready to interpret the data that will be coming our way over the next couple of weeks. So here's my "Intro to Omicron", for what it's worth.
What's This Variant Look Like?
It's immediately obvious that it has plenty of mutations in it compared to other variants, even Delta (and more on that below). But (as mentioned in yesterday's post) these mutations are far from evenly distributed. It has a bit of a "greatest hits collection" character to it, because many advantageous mutations keep on being advantageous. There are only two in the region coding for the N protein (the nucleocapsid), although these have been seen before and may be associated with higher viral loads. There's a three-residue deletion in the ORF1a region (sometimes annotated as NSP6), which has also been seen before, and might have something to do with immune evasion (although that's not clear). But there are a great many changes in the Spike protein - in fact, a really surprising number to be showing up all at once. For instance, there's a three-amino-acid sequence that's been inserted at position 214, and I don't think that's ever been seen before. There are several changes around the furin cleavage site (S1-S2) and a whole list of them around the receptor-binding domain (RBD) at the tip of the Spike itself.
Some of these (especially a deletion at 69 and 70) have provided a proxy that helped detect this variant early. A commonly used PCR assay for testing patient samples (TaqPath) targets three different regions of the coronavirus sequence, and one of those is in this part of the Spike. That 69-70 deletion, though, causes that leg of the assay to fail - the other two sequences amplify just fine, but the S-gene part is enough of a mismatch that it doesn't. So this "S-gene dropout" behavior has been used to monitor variants that get far enough away from the designed sequence - you don't know what variants they are at that point, but you know that you're dealing with something that has an odd S protein sequence. You'll want to go in and do real sequencing after you start seeing this behavior, because several variants have this deletion or others that might do the same thing, but it's a good early warning. S-gene dropout was in fact a major sign from the South African labs late last month that something new was up.
Where Did It Come From?
Good question! If you look at a tree diagram, you can see that Omicron really jumps off by itself. It is not a direct descendant of the Delta strains; it's coming in from a bit of a new direction. We don't see a lot of intermediate sequences, either, steps along the way to Omicron, even though these had to exist at some point. We just didn't see them to sequence them, which is of course a clue. An immediate hypothesis was that Omicron may have developed in a single immunocompromised human patient over a period of weeks or months. Recall how you go about developing resistance to a new drug in infectious organisms in the lab - you expose the pathogen to sublethal concentrations of the drug and gradually increase it over time. That way, you don't just immediately kill everything off - you give the virus or bacterium a chance to overcome a lesser challenge before turning up the pressure a bit more, letting mutations accumulate and try their worth over and over as the challenge slowly increases.
That's just what's going on inside a coronavirus patient if they can't mount a full immune response. The virus and the immune system engage in a prolonged battle where neither one can land a decisive blow, and things just keep on evolving. This is why they tell you to take your full course of antibiotics when you have a bacterial infection, and why effective vaccines actually suppress variant formation: if you kill off the pathogens as quickly as possible, they don't have time to explore their mutational landscape. You need to hit them hard and fast and keep them off-balance. Because if you take it slow, you will give a viral or bacterial infection time to experiment, and you will regret it.
So that's one possibility, but some virologists think that Omicron has perhaps too many changes for even that process to have been operating. Another hypothesis (see Helen Branswell's article today) is that we humans may have first spilled some of our pandemic into an animal host, and then later spilled back over into humans again. That human-to-animal part happens, just as surely as viral infections move from animals to humans - for example, after the pandemic got going, we started finding SARS-Cov-2 in white-tailed deer, and older samples don't show it. Late last year there was an outbreak in European mink farms from human spillover as well, and many other species have been infected as well. Perhaps Omicron's precursor (something off the 20B clade) spent the last few months evolving in another species entirely before jumping back into humans. These are both plausible, and neither can be ruled out yet. Update: for more on Omicron's (interesting but indistinct) origins, see here and here.
Is It More Infectious? More Likely to Escape Our Immune Protections? Or What?
Here's what we're going to be trying to figure out in the next days and weeks. Right now it's just not clear, despite what you might see in some headlines. Omicron cases are popping up in a number of countries, and there will definitely be more. The UK is starting to see a rise in S-gene dropout test results, suggesting that Omicron could be on the way up there. I haven't seen similar data for the US, partly because our testing and surveillance during the pandemic has too often been a very unfunny joke. But the first US case showed up in California the other day, and you can expect to see "First Omicron Case in [Insert State Name]" headlines over the next couple of weeks, for sure. Israel, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Brazil and other countries are all starting to report small numbers of confirmed sequenced cases.
But right now, honestly, it could go either way. Several ways. The sudden apparent rise in South Africa certainly argues for higher transmissibility, but we'll have to see what happens in other countries as well. Remember, the Lambda variant came up strongly in Peru, Chile, Argentina, and other parts of South American back in the summer, but didn't really take off in the rest of the world. You can find plenty of stories from back in July and August warning everyone to brace for it, but that just didn't quite happen (this is not a complaint). Instead, it was Delta that roared around the world. Omicron might kick Delta aside and become the dominant strain. Or the map could turn into a patchwork, with some areas much more affected than others (which, to be sure, has been the dominant mode throughout the whole pandemic). Or, less likely but not impossibly, Omicron could turn out to be less of a problem than it now appears.
Here's a good thread on Twitter from Trevor Bedford trying to work with the data we have now. He makes several plausible assumptions and shows how these lead to a spectrum of transmissibility and immune escape. Right now, the data support Omicron lying along a curve in that space, with higher transmissibility implying lower propensity for immune escape, and vice versa - you can make the epidemiological data fit with several combinations of those two, but what it doesn't fit is a Doomsday Coronavirus scenario where both of those are maxed out. If that were true, things would already be worse, believe it. Looking at the large number of Spike region mutations, Bedford believes that it's likely that Omicron is going to show greater immune evasion at the expense of transmissibility, and in fact it's possible that it might in the end be less transmissible than Delta is. If this story from Israel pans out, that might be what we're seeing.
But the greater immune evasion is, of course, still not good news. Again, that does not mean that vaccine protection (or protection via prior infection) is suddenly useless, just that it may have been eroded to some degree that isn't clear yet. Just as before, you really, really need to get vaccinated, and you really, really need to get a booster if you can do that as well. That's a far better option than facing either Delta or Omicron with a naive immune system - and if the latter really is a bit better at evading the human immune response, it's even more desirable to tune that up as much as possible before you get exposed at all. I get a lot of email from people who are worried about vaccine safety, and although I don't share most of their concerns, I can at least understand them. But the people who refuse to get vaccinated because they apparently think they can fight off the virus better without it, those are the folks that I'm completely baffled by.
What Now?
We gather as much reliable data as we can, as quickly as we can. We carefully monitor the spread of this variant and we try to figure out how many people each new patient has infected. We sequence cases as much as we can to make sure that Omicron isn't drifting into something even more concerning. Once people have recovered from it, we take blood samples from them and characterize what their immune response looks like and compare it to post-Delta cases and others. And (in experiments that are going on right now) we take blood samples from people who've had Delta, others who've had two shots of vaccine, and others who've had those plus a booster and we see how well their antibodies can neutralize Omicron in vitro. Those experiments will give us the earliest read on what we might expect in all these populations if this variant does really take off in the world, and we'll be watching the real-world data to make sure that things follow in the way we expect. We don't know nearly enough today - but we're going to know a lot more very soon.