Violence has begun to feel routine in Pakistan, a grim normalization that reflects a deeper and more dangerous reality: the country’s security situation has deteriorated sharply, marking the sixth consecutive year of rising terrorism. The Global Terrorism Index 2026, released by the Institute for Economics and Peace, crystallizes this trend with stark clarity.
While the world as a whole recorded a substantial fall in terrorism deaths by 28 percent and attacks by nearly 22 percent, Pakistan moved in the opposite direction. For the first time, it ranked number one on the index, recording 1,139 terrorism‑related deaths in 2025, a six percent increase from the previous year.
This spike marks the continuation of a long, troubling trajectory. Terrorism‑related deaths in Pakistan have risen every year for six years, and the latest increase is the largest year‑on‑year jump in a decade. The number of attacks more than doubled from 517 in 2023 to 1,099 in 2024, then showed a slight decline in 2025, though it remained at historically elevated levels. The report’s indicators, which include incidents, fatalities, injuries, and hostages, paint a picture of a country where militant violence is not only persistent but evolving in ways that challenge the state’s capacity to respond.
The report identifies several drivers behind this surge. Pakistan’s strained relationship with Afghanistan, particularly after the Taliban’s return to power, has created fertile ground for cross‑border militancy. The banned Tehreek‑i‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has emerged as the deadliest group operating in the country and the third deadliest globally.
Since 2009, TTP attacks have constituted more than 67 percent of all terrorist incidents in Pakistan, and the group has carried out five times as many attacks as the second most active organization, the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA). In 2025 alone, TTP incidents increased by 24 percent, with all attacks occurring inside Pakistan, primarily in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa near the Afghan border.
The presence of two of the world’s deadliest terrorist organizations—Islamic State (IS) and TTP—complicates the landscape. Their operations, networks, and ideological influence intersect in ways that make Pakistan one of the most complex theatres of militant activity in the world.
The human toll of this violence is staggering. The country witnessed a dramatic spike in hostage‑taking, rising from 101 in 2024 to 655 in 2025. Much of this increase is attributed to the Jaffar Express attack, in which 442 passengers were taken hostage. Without this single incident, global hostage‑taking numbers would have fallen by 30 percent.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan remain the epicenters of violence, accounting for more than 74 percent of attacks and 67 percent of deaths in 2025. These regions, long neglected in terms of governance and development, continue to bear the brunt of Pakistan’s internal conflict.
The state has responded forcefully. Counterterrorism operations intensified, resulting in the killing of more than 1,000 militants. Yet the paradox is hard to ignore: despite hundreds of operations, attacks continue to rise.
This imbalance reveals a deeper structural problem. Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy remains heavily skewed toward kinetic action raids, reprisals, and targeted strikes, while the non‑kinetic pillars of counter‑extremism remain weak, fragmented, or entirely absent.
One of the clearest symptoms of this weakness is the absence of a credible, verifiable terrorism database. Global organizations rely on transparent, evidence‑based reporting, yet Pakistan’s law‑enforcement agencies often expect the world to accept their claims without documentation.
The National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta), the body legally mandated to coordinate counterterrorism policy and maintain national data, offers little beyond a list of proscribed organizations. Its website lacks detailed statistics, incident breakdowns, or analytical reports. Provincial police forces occasionally release figures, but these are inconsistent and lack methodological clarity. The military’s media wing, ISPR, frequently provides numbers but rarely the granular details needed for independent verification or policy evaluation.
This data vacuum has consequences. It undermines Pakistan’s credibility in global assessments, contributes to its high ranking on international indices, and, more importantly, prevents the state from understanding the full scope of the threat it faces. Without accurate data, policy becomes reactive rather than strategic, driven by crisis rather than foresight.
Meanwhile, the nature of the threat itself is changing. The Pak Institute for Peace Studies, which has tracked militancy since 2005, reported a sharp surge in violence in 2025: 699 terrorist attacks nationwide, a 34 percent increase from the previous year. These attacks claimed at least 1,034 lives and injured 1,366 people.
The most striking shift is in the targets. Security personnel now constitute a large share of those killed. Police stations, patrols, and checkpoints have come under repeated assault. Military units have suffered significant losses. The return of suicide attacks after a period of relative decline signals renewed organizational capacity among militant groups. Suicide operations require planning, logistics, ideological indoctrination, and operational confidence. Their resurgence suggests not desperation but consolidation.
There is a danger in accepting this as the new normal. While civilian casualties have fallen slightly, violence against the state is intensifying. This shift should serve as a warning. A security policy built primarily on force cannot deliver lasting peace when ideological militancy, cross‑border sanctuaries, political instability, and governance deficits remain unaddressed.
Breaking this cycle requires more than firepower. It demands political clarity, consistent civilian governance in conflict‑hit regions, and serious regional diplomacy, particularly with Afghanistan. It requires police reforms that strengthen local law enforcement rather than sidelining it. It requires intelligence sharing across agencies that often operate in silos. And it requires judicial reforms that ensure militants are prosecuted effectively rather than recycled back into the conflict.
Fatima El Hashimi is a Moroccan researcher and journalist specializing in geopolitics and international relations.
https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2026/04/pakistan_tops_the_global_terrorism_index.html
