According to Politico:
The Senate on Thursday rejected legislation that would have required approval from Congress before President Donald Trump could take military action against Venezuela, despite bipartisan misgivings about the administration’s secretive efforts in the region.
Just two Republicans broke ranks to oppose Trump. The 49-51 vote is the second failed bid in a month to rein in the U.S. military campaign against suspected drug-trafficking vessels in Latin America that has led to the deaths of nearly 70 people.
Mercifully, the measure failed. Now we're beginning to get news as to why that is so:
Hezbollah plans to expand its operations in Venezuela, focusing on money laundering, and the production and smuggling of cocaine and Captagon, according to Lebanese diplomatic sources who spoke to UAE-based EREM News. The group reportedly seeks to recruit young supporters in…
— Faytuks Network (@FaytuksNetwork) November 6, 2025
Here are some more specifics:
For the unfamiliar, Hezbollah has cultivated significant networks and influence in South America, especially Venezuela, over the past two decades.
— John Ridge 🇺🇸 🇺🇦 🇹🇼 (@John_A_Ridge) November 7, 2025
Their primary focus has been generating revenue through narcotics trafficking to support their operations in Lebanon. https://t.co/H8bOSYUITv pic.twitter.com/TTdH8Yq1fi
According to this RAND analysis:
There is evidence that Hezbollah has actively sought to develop operational capabilities both within the United States and in Latin America. In the United States, this is exemplified by the 2017 arrests of alleged Islamic Jihad organization operatives who had surveilled potential targets in New York City on behalf of Hezbollah (Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, 2017). The group’s operational presence in Latin America was most recently demonstrated in November 2023, when Brazilian authorities disrupted a suspected Hezbollah cell planning attacks against Jewish targets (Grattan, 2023). Although robust U.S. homeland security measures may better contain such threats domestically, Hezbollah’s illicit activities in Latin America—where security infrastructure may be less developed—pose a distinct risk to U.S. interests throughout the region. Geopolitical realities exacerbate these concerns. The deaths of Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and his presumed successor Hashem Safieddine in Israeli airstrikes, combined with growing direct U.S. support of Israel, could prompt the organization to leverage its global networks more aggressively (Jackson, 2024; Jones et al., 2024). This leadership transition period may be particularly volatile for Hezbollah’s international operations, including its sleeper cell capabilities in the United States and Latin America.
RAND says Hezb'allah is primarily focused on fundraising for its nefarious activities in the Middle East, but it's been known to strike out at U.S. and Israeli targets in this hemisphere, too:
These funding mechanisms reportedly encompass drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking, illegal mining, identity theft, and money laundering schemes (Hesterman, 2005, pp. 34–45).
And Venezuela is the epicenter:
The Chávez and Maduro regimes have established Venezuela as an operational hub for Hezbollah. Building on longstanding connections with Iran, the Venezuelan government has created an environment that allows Hezbollah to maintain active cells engaging in drug trafficking, money laundering, and illicit smuggling (Clarke, 2019; Young, 2024). This permissive atmosphere extends deep into Venezuela’s political sphere, in which Hezbollah collaborates extensively with government officials on intelligence infrastructure, securing arms, identification documents, bank accounts, and pipelines for moving operatives and equipment (Humire, 2020). The variety of ways that this threat is characterized in public discussion is evident in unclassified documentation: Although the State Department’s 2018 and 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism briefly noted the presence of Hezbollah sympathizers in Venezuela, the 2021 and 2022 reports contained no references to Hezbollah activities (U.S. Department of State, undated-a, undated-b, undated-c, undated-d, 2019). Evidence of these state-level connections emerged clearly when Venezuelan politicians were found issuing passports to Hezbollah operatives (U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 2020). The U.S. Department of the Treasury has identified key figures in this network, including Venezuelan businessman Fawzi Kan’an and diplomat Ghazi Nasr al-Din—who facilitate ideological training, militia preparation, and illicit arms and narcotics trafficking networks (Humire, 2020; U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 2020). The 2020 indictment of former Venezuelan lawmaker Adel El Zabayar—who was charged with coordinating cocaine and weapon trafficking between Maduro’s government and Hezbollah—further demonstrates these state-level connections (U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 2020). Iran’s strategic partnership with Venezuela has strengthened Hezbollah’s regional position significantly. In June 2022, Iran and Venezuela formalized a 20-year cooperation agreement, in which Maduro explicitly aligned his country with Iran’s Axis of Resistance (“Maduro: We Are All Part of Axis of Resistance,” 2022). The alliance manifests in practical support through various channels: State-run airlines, such as CONVIASA, reportedly transport operatives and illegal items while Iranian oil tankers deliver fuel to Venezuela, demonstrating the intertwined nature of these relationships (Berg, 2022; Zerpa, Bartenstein, and Millard, 2020). The Iran-Venezuela axis has provided Hezbollah with substantial resources, diplomatic protection, and operational flexibility.
There are other ugly things coming out of Venezuela to suggest it is a threat, besides Hezb'allah dealing drugs -- such as this news from Colombia:
El dinero para asesinar a Miguel salió de Venezuela https://t.co/0nXWkmOcnv
— Miguel Uribe (@migueluribel) November 7, 2025
The father of murdered presidential hopeful Miguel Uribe, who was assassinated in broad daylight last year, stated that investigators have found that the cash used to pay the assassins, came from Venezuela.
Venezuela again.
Does anyone think they wouldn't try that here? They already have against Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Assassination is their chief export now, from both them and their Hezb'allah ally.
The U.S. under Trump is not letting up:
The Trump Administrations has a zero tolerance policy for narco-terrorists bringing poison into our country.
— Department of State (@StateDept) November 8, 2025
Thanks to @POTUS, the United States is taking action to keep Americans SAFE! 💥🇺🇸 pic.twitter.com/5YquwDVuvX
And that's good -- they seem to be staying steady on course, and now have a greener light with the Senate vote failure. They should keep going, because Hezb'allah and Venezuela itself are clearly threats. It would be awful if we were to just react to potentially disastrous acts.
If there's any doubt Venezuela is a bigger threat than it looks, check out what Hezb'allah and other rogues are doing.







