In today’s Los Angeles Times, Cato senior fellow Dr. Jeffrey A. Singer
and I note that once the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptives‐coverage
mandate took full effect in 2014, “prices for hormones and oral
contraceptives stopped falling and instead skyrocketed. By 2019, they
had risen three times as fast as prices for prescription drugs overall.”
Here we provide the underlying data.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) dramatically expanded insurance
coverage for prescription contraceptives such as “the pill.” From August
2012 through January 2014, the federal government phased in the ACA’s
requirement that nearly all private health insurance plans must cover
all Food and Drug Administration‐approved prescription contraceptives
with no cost‐sharing. In addition, from 2014 through 2017, the ACA
enrolled an estimated
5 million previously uninsured women of child‐bearing age in either
private insurance plans subject to that mandate or in Medicaid, which
also covers prescription contraceptives with no cost‐sharing.
As a result of these changes, the share of consumers who are
sensitive to the price of contraceptives plummeted. The Kaiser Family
Foundation reports
that, among women with large‐employer coverage who use oral
contraceptives, “the share experiencing out‐of‐pocket
spending…declined from 94 percent in 2012 to 11 percent in 2017.” From
2012 through 2014, ACA‐mandated coverage
of contraceptives all by itself “account[ed] for nearly two‐thirds
(63%) of the drop in out‐of‐pocket spending on retail drugs” across
all consumers.
The ACA’s reshaping of the market for oral contraceptives precisely
coincided with a dramatic increase in prices for those items. Since
December 2009, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Producer Price
Index (PPI) has measured the prices manufacturers receive for a sample
of domestically produced hormones and oral contraceptives. The nearby
figure shows what happened to real prices for hormones and oral
contraceptives before and after the ACA’s contraceptives‐coverage
mandate took effect.
Before the mandate took effect — i.e., during a period when consumers
more often paid for oral contraceptives directly — price changes for
hormones and oral contraceptives generally followed a path similar to
that of non‐prescription drugs, which insurance typically does not
cover, and which also fell in real terms. Prices for hormones and oral
contraceptives actually fell by 12 percent in real terms.
As the mandate began to take effect and as the ACA made oral
contraceptives seem “free” to more purchasers, prices for hormones and
oral contraceptives began to rise. By the time the mandate took full
effect in early 2014, prices for hormones and oral contraceptives
reversed five years of real reductions and caught up to the 17 percent
growth in real prices for other prescription drugs.
Once the mandate took full effect, prices began to rise rapidly. From
May 2013 through May 2019, while real prices for non‐prescription
drugs and prescription drugs overall rose just 12 percent and 37
percent, respectively, prices for hormones and oral contraceptives rose
108 percent. That’s nearly three times the rate of price growth for
other prescription drugs.
The PPI for hormones and oral contraceptives has limitations as
a measure of prices for hormonal contraceptives in general and oral
contraceptives in particular. First, it samples and estimates changes in
the initial prices drug manufacturers receive, not the ultimate prices
insurers and consumers pay. Second, it samples and estimates changes in
prices only for domestically produced drugs, excluding drugs produced in
other countries and Puerto Rico. Third, it encompasses drugs other than
contraceptives that may have an important influence on the index.
Unfortunately, the BLS neither discloses which drugs it samples nor
the relative contributions of contraceptives versus other hormonal
drugs. The PPI for hormones and oral contraceptives is therefore an
imperfect measure because it does not necessarily reflect the changes in
consumer prices for all hormonal contraceptives available to consumers,
and may instead reflect changes in (non‐consumer) prices for
non‐contraceptive hormonal drugs. The BLS’s Consumer Price Index (CPI)
for prescription drugs lacks some of these shortcomings. Unfortunately,
the BLS does not publish CPIs for prescription drugs at the level of
therapeutic class.
Even with these limitations, these data suggest that trying to make
oral contraceptives “free” for insured consumers had the unintended
consequence of making them far more expensive for insurance companies
and women who buy them without insurance, including young women who
prefer not to purchase them through their parents’ insurance.
In the Cato Institute book Overcharged, Cato adjunct scholars Charles Silver and David Hyman
explain why paying for health care through insurance often causes
prices to rise. Despite the supposed purchasing power of third‐party
payers, insurers are not very good at reducing prices. When consumers
don’t care about prices, they actively resist attempts by third‐party
payers to negotiate lower prices. This dynamic gives providers,
including manufacturers of oral contraceptives, free rein to raise
prices.
In a forthcoming Cato Institute white paper, Singer and I propose
taking away the FDA’s power to require women to obtain a prescription
before purchasing birth control pills.
Michael F. Cannon is the Cato Institute’s director of health policy studies.
https://www.cato.org/blog/aca-expanded-insurance-coverage-contraceptives-prices-soared
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