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Tuesday, June 11, 2019

Trulicity heart data falls short for Lilly investors

  • Eli Lilly’s injectable diabetes drug Trulicity reduced the risk of heart attacks, stroke and cardiovascular death by 12% when compared to placebo, according to full data from the REWIND trial presented at the American Diabetes Association meeting in San Francisco. Investors, however, had been expecting a greater risk reduction.
  • Trulicity is the leading drug in its class of GLP-1 agonists, but is locked in fierce competition with two Novo Nordisk products, Victoza and Ozempic. Victoza’s cardiovascular outcomes trial previously revealed a similar-looking 13% reduction in risk.
  • Investors were counting on Trulicity reducing cardiovascular risk by about 20%, Cowen analyst Steve Scala wrote in a June 10 note to clients. Lilly shares fell more than 3% in early trading Monday.

Drugs to treat diabetes aim to reduce blood sugar levels. But because the main cause of death in diabetics is heart disease, regulators and insurers want to see clear signs treatments also improve cardiovascular health.
To confirm whether that benefit exists, regulators have asked for post-approval cardiovascular outcomes trials, which require thousands of patients monitored over years.
REWIND enrolled 9,901 patients receiving either Trulicity (dulaglutide) or a placebo, with both arms otherwise receiving standard of care treatment. Patients were followed for more than five years, with a primary endpoint combining the occurrence of non-fatal myocardial infarction or stroke, or cardiovascular death.
The 12% reduction in risk looks similar to the 13% scored by Victoza (liraglutide) in Novo’s LEADER trial. Lilly executives were quick to point out that Novo’s study enrolled patients only with established cardiovascular disease, while REWIND enrolled both those with established disease and those with risk factors for heart-related complications.
Further analysis revealed that in those with established cardiovascular disease, patients taking Trulicity saw a risk reduction similar to Victoza, 13%. Novo’s second GLP-1 agent, Ozempic (semaglutide), reduced risk by 26% in patients with established cardiovascular disease in the SUSTAIN-6 trial, although that was a smaller and shorter study.
Lilly executives said they are pursuing an addition to the Trulicity label that will allow its marketing campaigns to emphasize the cardiovascular benefit in both the established and high-risk cardiovascular populations. The 20% benefit for which investors were hoping would have given Trulicity a clear edge so, while positive, REWIND’s full results could mean a tougher marketing battle.
Trulicity’s big advantage over Victoza is once-weekly dosing versus once-daily. Novo has sought to counter this with once-weekly Ozempic, along with a once-daily oral version of semaglutide that is now under Food and Drug Administration review. The Ozempic label so far only highlights that there is no increased risk of cardiovascular events based on the SUSTAIN-6 trial.
Moreover, as competition heats up, decisions over which drug patients receive may depend less on efficacy and more on insurance coverage, especially since Victoza has been excluded from some formularies.
“We think the precise details are less important here given growth of the GLP-1 class is being driven by primary care physicians whose prescribing decisions are often less data driven and impacted by factors such as formulary positioning and the injection device,” Credit Suisse analyst Vamil Divan wrote in a June 10 note.
In the meantime, Lilly is seeking to bolster its diabetes pipeline by pushing through a new experimental agent, tirzepatide, which acts on both GLP-1 and a second hormone called GIP. The Indianapolis-based company presented data from Phase 2 trials of tirzepatide at ADA that showed numerically greater reductions in blood sugar levels and body weight than dulaglutide.
A 15mg once-weekly dose was associated with treatment discontinuations due to gastrointestinal side effects. However, trial investigators have developed a protocol that can reduce discontinuations, which will be used in the Phase 3 program. Lilly expects to have the first pivotal data by late 2020.

Raymond James Upgrades CymaBay Therapeutic (CBAY) to Strong Buy

 https://www.streetinsider.com/Analyst+Comments/UPDATE%3A+Raymond+James+Upgrades+CymaBay+Therapeutic+%28CBAY%29+to+Strong+Buy/15601609.html

Industry-funded attacks on CDC opioid prescribing guide eroding public health

A public health document that counsels physicians to not overprescribe opioids would seem to be an unlikely candidate for attack. Yet the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s “Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain,” published in 2016, has attracted constant criticism since its inception. The attacks come from two directions: groups and physicians who receive money from opioid manufacturers and patients with chronic pain.
Until the CDC began drafting the guideline, opioid manufacturers had a firm grip on what the government said about opioids. The Food and Drug Administration parroted industry messaging on chronic pain and rejected mandatory opioid-related training for physicians. Industry lobbyists orchestrated the creation of a 19-member panel at the National Institutes of Health to coordinate pain research. Many of the panelists were heavily beholden to the pharmaceutical industry.
In contrast, the CDC applied strict conflict-of-interest restrictions to the authors of its opioid prescribing guideline. When the impeccably evidence-based draft was released, the pharmaceutical-industry-funded Washington Legal Foundation accused the CDC of failing to follow administrative processes. The Academy of Integrative Pain Management demanded that Congress investigate how the CDC had developed the guideline. A probe by the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, however, found that the CDC had done nothing wrong.
After receiving a barrage of complaints from the industry-friendly NIH panel, the FDA, and industry-funded advocacy groups that disparaged both the drafting process for the guideline and its content, the CDC delayed release of the guidelineand opened a 30-day public comment period.
2017 analysis of the 158 organizations that submitted comments found that opposition to the guideline was significantly higher among organizations funded by opioid makers, life sciences companies, and those whose funding was unknown than among organizations not funded by industry. Notably, none of the organizations funded by opioid makers disclosed their funding.
That was exposed in a 2018 Senate report. In response to a request from then-Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.), the top five opioid manufacturers revealed almost $9 million in funding of pain groups between 2012 and 2017. According to the report, the “direct link between corporate donations and the advancement of opioid-friendly messages” is evidenced in the groups’ comments.
Some industry-friendly messages were not subtle. The American Academy of Pain Management, which received more than $1.2 million from opioid manufacturers over six years, was dismissive of opioid-associated deaths, stating “… to limit access to opioids because a small minority of people who use them develop a substance use disorder and/or suffer fatal respiratory depression, may be exacerbating the suffering of a far greater number of people whose pain goes unrelieved.”
In its comment, the American Cancer Society’s Cancer Action Network, which received $168,500 from opioid manufacturers, accused the CDC of a lack of transparency, weak evidence, and “failure to adhere to proper methodology in developing the guideline.” In fact, the guideline used a systematic approach of the best evidence available.
Maintaining pain patients on high doses of opioids is a consistent demand of both industry-funded organizations and pain patients. The American Academy of Pain Medicine (not to be confused with the American Academy of Pain Management), a recipient of $1.2 million from opioid manufacturers over six years, criticized recommendations of daily dosing limits, citing the proposed upper limit given in the guidelines as “an arbitrary dose.” The American Pain Society, recipient of almost $1 million, stated in its comment that “these thresholds are clearly arbitrary and without scientific basis.” And the American Society for Pain Management Nursing, which received more than $300,000commented that it was “concerning to set a maximum dose.”
The assault continued after the guideline was published. Bob Twillman, executive director of the American Academy of Pain Management, lamented about “the apparent lack of response by CDC to comments submitted by the Academy and numerous other pain management organizations and advocates.” The American Academy of Pain Medicine’s president, Dr. Daniel Carr, claimed that “the CDC guideline makes disproportionately strong recommendations based upon a narrowly selected portion of the available clinical evidence.”
Fresh attacks surfaced in 2019. A letter written to the CDC called for “a bold clarification about the 2016 Guideline — what it says and what it does not say.” Penned by Health Professionals for Patients in Pain (HP3), a group created for the purpose of challenging the guideline, the letter avoided direct attacks on the CDC while bemoaning the “misapplication” of the guideline. The letter’s authors claimed, without evidence, that “draconian and often rapid involuntary dose reductions” implemented by physicians, health care systems, and insurers are driving pain patients to the street to obtain opioids and contributing to patient suicides.
A distinction between street drug users and “legitimate” users of opioids is made by both industry and pain patients. Demonizing “abusers” is an industry tactic. As Richard Sackler, the former chairman and president of Purdue Pharma, the maker of OxyContin, put it in documents disclosed in litigation, “we have to hammer on the abusers in every way possible. They are the culprits and the problem. They are reckless criminals.”
While some of those who signed the HP3 letter have close ties to industry, many of the 300 signatories were well-intentioned health care professionals who did not realize the letter echoed marketing messages. They were used by the organization in much the same way opioid manufacturers use pain patients: as cover for industry efforts to maintain chronic pain as a market for opioids. The HP3 letter, which doesn’t oppose any facts in the CDC guideline and also provides no data supporting its claims, was covered by the New York Times, the Washington PostRolling Stone, and other media outlets.
Curiously, when PharmedOut, the Georgetown University Medical Center project that we represent, sent the CDC a letter supporting the guideline signed by seven national organizations and 364 health care providers and allies in May 2019, it received no press coverage.
The formation of HP3 came on the heels of the publication of an article by a conflict-laden group convened by the American Academy of Pain Medicine Foundation. Both the AAPM Foundation and most of the members of what it grandly called a “consensus panel” are funded by opioid manufacturers. The article refutes nothing in the CDC guideline but instead complains about its “misapplication” and — once again — dosing limits: “Daily dosage ceilings, if implemented as hard limits, may promote abrupt dose reductions in patients on high doses, which risks withdrawal symptoms, hyperalgesia [increased sensitivity to pain], and self-medication with more hazardous alternatives.”
Three cancer organizations, the National Comprehensive Cancer Network, the American Society of Clinical Oncology, and the American Society of Hematology, protested that although cancer-related pain was specifically excluded from the guideline, some cancer survivors were being denied opioids even though their chronic pain was related to cancer or cancer treatment.
All of these critics misrepresent the guideline, which never calls for dosage limits, dosage ceilings, forced tapers, fast tapers, or limiting opioids in people living with cancer.
In response to the HP3 letter, CDC Director Robert Redfield merely thanked the organization for its concern and reiterated what the guideline states: that abrupt or involuntary tapering is not what the best evidence recommends. Absurdly, HP3 called Redfield’s letter a “bold clarification.”
Dr. Debbie Dowell, a CDC medical officer and an author of the guideline, also responded to the cancer organizations, acknowledging that previously treated cancer patients were not specifically mentioned in the guideline. Dowell and the two other guideline authors responded to critics in the New England Journal of Medicine in April 2019, again reiterating that “… the guideline does not support stopping opioid use abruptly.”
Their NEJM article does say that misimplementation of the guideline could cause harm — a statement that was immediately spun by Dr. Sally Satel, a co-founder of HP3, as a “forceful and humane variant” of the HP3 letter.

Continuing attack

Criticism of the guideline follows a consistent pattern: no evidence provided to refute any statement in the guideline and no evidence provided for the critics’ claims. The eerily similar attacks on the guideline, and the subsequent spinning of the CDC’s we-meant-what-we-said responses to critics as some kind of admission of error or inadequacy, raise the question of whether this is a coordinated attempt by opioid manufacturers to use third parties to undermine, discredit, and smear the guideline.
There’s certainly a credible motive for opioid manufacturers to do this: The CDC guideline is an effective, evidence-based tool that has helped decrease inappropriate and dangerous prescribing of opioids for chronic pain patients.
Here’s the next line of attack on the CDC guideline: a competing report on opioids and pain management by the Department of Health and Human Services Pain Management Best Practices Inter-Agency Task Force. This report opposes many of the CDC’s recommendations and devotes an entire section to criticizing the CDC guideline. The task force includes many nongovernment members financially tied to opioid manufacturers — conflicts comprehensively outlined in a letter by Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), the ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee.
Letters of protest about the task force’s non-evidence-based draft report included a strongly worded letter from 39 attorneys general stating pointedly, “While this crisis continues, it is incomprehensible that officials would consider moving away from key components of the CDC Guideline …” Nonetheless, the task force overwhelmingly voted to approve a final draft on May 9, 2019. The final report was released on May 30.
A government-funded report that opposes the CDC opioid prescribing guideline is a major coup for opioid manufacturers. The fact that organizations and individuals funded by opioid manufacturers have stepped up their protests of the guideline in recent months is probably not a coincidence.

Opposition from chronic pain patients

Chronic pain patients have also criticized the CDC guideline. Most of the more than 4,000 comments the CDC received during the open comment period were from individuals. Although most chronic pain patients are not being paid by industry, their stories may be used by organizations paid by industry to advocate for doing away with recommended limits on opioid doses or duration.
Pain patients are important to opioid manufacturers because the bulk of opioids are consumed by people living with chronic pain. A crackdown on opioid pill mills has left many pain patients without access to the opioids they depend on, and finding a new physician willing to supply high-dose opioids is difficult. So-called legacy patients who are dependent on opioids certainly need access to these medications. They also need specialized care to taper down from dangerously high doses and multimodal pain treatment. But their advocacy for unlimited access to opioids for themselves may be used to justify new, ongoing opioid prescriptions for chronic pain patients — who will then become future generations of opioid-dependent patients.
As far as real solutions for the opioid epidemic, the authors of the CDC guideline offer one in their NEJM article: “Starting fewer patients on opioid treatment and not escalating to high dosages in the first place will reduce the numbers of patients prescribed high dosages in the long term.”
It is essential that we not abandon patients on long-term opioids — but it is also important that we not create more of them. Opioid manufacturers stand to lose substantial profits with the widespread adoption of the CDC guideline. Public health, however, benefits from the guideline, and attacks on it bear industry’s fingerprints.
Ben Goodwin is a research assistant at PharmedOut, a research and education project at Georgetown University Medical Center. Judy Butler is a research fellow at PharmedOut. Adriane Fugh-Berman, M.D., is the director of PharmedOut and a professor in the department of pharmacology and physiology and the department of family medicine at Georgetown University Medical Center. She also serves as an expert witness at the request of plaintiffs in cases regarding pharmaceutical marketing practices.

Stem cell clinics co-opt clinical-trials registry to market unproven therapies

A few weeks ago, if you’d been scouring the ever-expanding mass of digitized federal paperwork, you might have noticed a contradiction.
On the one hand, the Food and Drug Administration issued a letter stating that what an Arizona distributor was selling as stem cell therapies were “unapproved” and posed “safety concerns.” On the other, a National Institutes of Health database — clinicaltrials.gov — went right on listing the same merchant’s studies, with a link to the company’s website and the word “Recruiting” displayed invitingly in green.
Similar scenarios have been popping up like fungi after rain. When a judge ruled last week that the FDA could stop the work of U.S. Stem Cell, the firm’s trials remained on clinicaltrials.gov; the postings were no longer actively enlisting patients, but they didn’t mention that the company’s injections had blinded at least four people, either.
Nor did a study listing sponsored by Cell Surgical Network include any indication that the FDA is seeking an injunction against that company, too.
Nor did the five entries from StemGenex say anywhere that regulators had found the clinic’s marketing to be illegal in 2018.
What worries bioethicists and biologists is not just the crossing of governmental wires. It’s also these companies’ co-opting of a taxpayer-funded database to market therapies without proof of safety or regulatory review. To let such dubious vendors post on a federal website, the critics say, is to lend them an air of legitimacy they don’t deserve.
“You can concoct this bogus appearance of science, call it a clinical study, recruit people to pay to participate in your study, and not only that: You can actually register on clinicaltrials.gov and have the federal government help you promote what you’re doing,” said University of Minnesota bioethicist Leigh Turner, a longtime critic of such rogue clinics. “That struck me as both dangerous and brilliant.”
Clinicaltrials.gov is a bit like the Wikipedia of human experiments — at once useful and dicey because of its huge, democratic breadth. Launched in 2000, in response to a 1997 law requiring the registration of clinical trials, the website was intended for patients, doctors, and researchers alike. Its goal, in a sense, has been to lay bare the innards of biomedical research, allowing anyone and everyone to see what experimental therapies had been tried, which had worked, and — perhaps most importantly — which hadn’t.
Though every one of the 308,000 listings has, according to the NIH, undergone audits both human and automated, the quality of each post, as on Wikipedia, is highly dependent on the poster.
And, as Turner and others have chronicled, some of the posters aren’t exactly pure as the driven snow. These critics’ concerns extend beyond the shadowy marketplace of treatments advertised as stem cells — from scientifically suspect homeopathy regimens to less-than-reputable answers to autism. But self-described stem cell clinics are among the most common, and as such, have sparked some tricky questions. At a time when lawmakers castigate tech giants for their misinformation-spreading algorithms, what responsibility do government agencies have over the data submitted to their own online repositories? And where to draw the line between what’s allowed and what isn’t?
While there are some gray zones, Turner said, there are also some cases in which the answer is pretty clear: Namely, if a clinic’s doings are worrisome enough to trigger an FDA warning or legal action, its studies should probably be redacted from clinicaltrials.gov.
The NIH said in an email to STAT that clinicaltrials.gov includes information “about the potential risks and benefits of participating in a trial and urges people to talk to their doctors about whether to join a study.” It added that the agency “is exploring additional measures” to enhance public understanding of human research and how to use the website.
The danger posed by some trials in the database is not theoretical. In 2015, a handful of patients went legally blind after having bits of their own fat sucked from their abdomens, modified, and injected into their eyes at a clinic operated by U.S. Stem Cell in Sunrise, Fla. Two of them had come across the company on clinicaltrials.gov.
That particular clinic did not respond to requests for comment, but the CEO of another one — also the subject of FDA actions — spoke with STAT on condition of anonymity. His company gets a few clients from postings on clinicaltrials.gov, but that’s not the main reason his staff posts there. “Most of what I get off clinicaltrials.gov is a little bit annoying … patients who expect procedures for free,” he said. “I wouldn’t say it’s a humungous patient-acquisition method at all.”
The website does help him boost his company’s credibility, though. “If the practice does a presentation or I do a presentation, and an educated consumer goes to clinicaltrials.gov, and wants to see the specifics of the study, it’s important to have it there,” he said.
That’s exactly what neuroscientist Sally Temple worries about. As the scientific director of the nonprofit Neural Stem Cell Institute, in Rensselaer, N.Y., she knows that legitimate clinical trials typically don’t involve patients paying to be treated.
Not only is it unethical to charge people for an unproven therapy; it also often means that the study won’t involve comparing the treatment to a placebo or another intervention, which is what allows researchers to say whether or not the remedy being tested actually had an effect.
Part of the issue is that there are scientifically valid uses for certain stem cells. They are, in a sense, the body’s raw materials, able to shape-shift into tissues that need repairing. Bone marrow stem cells are already used to treat leukemia, sickle cell anemia, and other diseases — and researchers are looking at myriad other potential uses.
Temple, for instance, is applying to the FDA for permission to test whether stem cells that live inside the retina might work to rejuvenate layers of eye cells that are dying off and preventing eyesight in the elderly. She worries that patients might go onto clinicaltrials.gov and confuse her own meticulous work — which involves animal studies, regulatory approvals, and carefully designed, grant-funded human trials — with those unapproved sellers of “stem cells,” some of whom may in fact not be providing stem cells at all, given that their products are often un-vetted.
“The clinics that are doing this type of surgical procedure — taking fat and putting it somewhere else without any real rationale — that is a big threat for groups like us that are trying to do it the way that is understood to form a path toward a safe and effective therapy,” she told STAT. “Patients who’ve heard about this may say, ‘Well, stem cells, if they’re injected they an cause blindness, so I’m not going to participate in a study.’ Is that going to reduce the possibility that we would be able to recruit patients?”
But simply scrubbing studies that don’t comply with FDA regulations from clinicaltrials.gov is more complicated than it seems. As Tania Bubela, dean of the faculty of health sciences at Simon Fraser University, outside of Vancouver, explained, “It has become the go-to repository for clinical trials internationally. … A lot of the international trial sites would not fall within the jurisdiction of the FDA, and so there is no ability for the FDA to want or take action against the organizations that are running trials outside of the U.S.”
She also worries that taking down studies will arouse distrust on the part of some patients. “If we simply make these things disappear, it can start to look like a big government conspiracy,” she said.
Instead, she suggested a warning that pops up when someone types in specific search terms — “stem cells,” say — that are likely to yield questionable results. While Turner would prefer to see potentially dangerous listings removed, he said that flagging them as such would be the next best thing.
For now, the warning that prospective patients are most likely to encounter as they click from trial posting to trial posting is the same every single entry: “The safety and scientific validity of this study is the responsibility of the study sponsor and investigators. Listing a study does not mean it has been evaluated by the U.S. Federal Government.”
It’s the legal equivalent of a shrug, perhaps the defining move of the internet age, in which we’re constantly invited to post and peruse at our own peril. We know that in those mountains of data there’s both gold and pyrite to be had — and we’re suspicious of anyone telling us where we can and can’t dig. The trouble is that we often overestimate our ability to identify what we’ve found.
As historians of science and psychologists have pointed out, couching knowledge in layers of misinformation can be an effective way, willful or not, of spreading ignorance. “The paradox appears to be that the people who are most in need of advice don’t know when they need advice,” explained David Dunning, a University of Michigan psychologist who studies how well we can gauge what we don’t know.
That’s why Dennis Clegg, who studies stem cell-based eye therapies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, has stopped referring people to clinicaltrials.gov. “I used to tell people all the time, ‘Go to clinicaltrials.gov, and you can see what’s going on,’” he said. “But if they’re listing the so-called patient-funded research, where patients have to pay $5,000 or $10,000 … now the best advice I can give is, ‘Talk to your ophthalmologist.’”

Genfit defends elafibranor after CymaBay-linked selloff

In the wake of a selloff stoked by disappointing results for CymaBay’s (CBAY-45.4%) NASH candidate seladelpar, Genfit SA (GNFT -14.2%) has released a letter to investors aimed at clearing up any “confusion” with elafibranor. To wit:
FDA approval will be based on NASH resolution without worsening of fibrosis via histological examination (evaluating tissue samples with a microscope). By this definition, elafibranor was successful in a Phase 2b study. An ongoing Phase 3, RESOLVE-IT, has the same endpoint. Preliminary data should be available by year-end.
The reduction in liver fat content, the endpoint in CymaBay’s Phase 2b studythat caused the selloff, is not considered a relevant efficacy endpoint by regulators.
It has also shown beneficial effects on HbA1C, insulin sensitivity and “bad cholesterol.”

Dassault called near Medidata purchase

Dassault Systemes (OTCPK:DASTF,OTCPK:DASTY) is nearing a deal to acquire Medidata Solutions (NASDAQ:MDSO), according to Bloomberg sources.
MDSO shares are up 4.4% after hours to $98.90.

Alzheimer’s Drug May Help Treat Opioid Addiction

The cholinesterase inhibitor galantamine (Razadyne, Janssen) has shown promise as a treatment for opioid addiction, preliminary research suggests.
A secondary analysis of a randomized controlled trial showed reduced opioid use with the cognitive enhancer. Galantamine is thought to have a dual mechanism of action, increasing levels of acetylcholine in the brain and binding to nicotinic receptors, which play a role in addiction to nicotine and other substances.
“My colleagues and I are excited about these preliminary findings, as they could point to new strategies for helping those with opioid use disorder. We hope to pursue this in future research,” principal investigator Kathleen Carroll, PhD, Department of Psychiatry, Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut, said in a news release.
The results were published online June 4 in The American Journal on Addictions.

Anti-Addictive Effect?

Previous clinical research showed galantamine-associated reductions in heavy alcohol and cigarette use. In addition, in preclinical studies, cholinesterase inhibitors reduced self-administration of cocaine, opioids, and nicotine.
This led the investigators to hypothesize that galantamine, or more generally cholinesterase inhibitors, have an ‘anti-addictive’ effect through a common mechanism shared by different drugs of abuse.
To investigate, the researchers conducted a secondary analysis of a randomized, placebo-controlled trial testing the efficacy of galantamine (8 mg daily extended-release) and computerized cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) as a treatment for cocaine use disorder in patients stabilized on methadone for co-occurring opioid use disorder (OUD).
A total of 120 patients participated (mean age, 38 years; 67% men; 52% white) in the 12-week trial that also included a 6-month follow-up period.
The main findings of the trial showed a significant reduction in frequency of cocaine use over time for galantamine vs placebo and CBT vs standard methadone treatment alone.
The secondary analysis found a “significant main effect” for galantamine vs placebo in terms of the percentage of urine specimens testing negative for opioids, both during treatment (77% vs. 62%; P = .027) and during the 6-month follow-up period (81% vs. 59%, P = .001).
The benefit of galantamine on reduction in opioid use was seen early in treatment, with patients on placebo submitting the first opioid-positive urine specimen much sooner than patients on galantamine (median day, 15 vs. 53; P = .02).

Novel Treatment for OUD

In an accompanying commentary, Scott Moeller, PhD, and Anissa Abi-Dargham, MD, of the Department of Psychiatry, Renaissance School of Medicine at Stony Brook University in Stony Brook, New York, note the study authors “appear to have uncovered a novel and potentially impactful therapeutic for OUD, a disease that is devastating the United States.”
“While the behavioral mechanism remains elusive,” they note, “this report nonetheless suggests numerous exciting directions for future research. Future investigations have the potential to yield valuable information on galantamine as a medication to push forward clinical practice, as well as yield valuable scientific knowledge on the brain cholinergic system and its involvement in OUD and other addictions.
“If the Carroll et al results are replicated and extended in future trials and clinical laboratory studies, and given that galantamine has shown efficacy in other addictions such as alcohol and cigarette smoking, it is possible that galantamine may emerge as an exciting, next‐generation adjunctive medication for improving clinical outcomes in OUD,” Moeller and Abi-Dargham conclude.
The study was supported by a grant from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. Carroll is a member of CBT4CBT LLC, which makes validated forms of CBT4CBT available to qualified clinical providers. Moeller and Abi-Dargham have disclosed no relevant financial relationships.
Am J Addict. Published online June 4, 2019. AbstractEditorial