DOI 10.3386/w32962
The COVID-19 pandemic led to unprecedented levels of federal transfers to state governments. Did this funding increase benefit incumbent politicians electorally? Identifying the effect of revenue windfalls on voting is challenging because whatever conditions led to the influx of cash might also benefit or harm incumbents for other reasons. We develop an instrument that allows us to predict allocations to states based on variation in congressional representation. We find that incumbents in state-wide races in 2020, 2021, and 2022 performed significantly better in states that received more relief funding due to their overrepresentation in Congress. These results are robust across specifications and after adjusting for a variety of economic and political controls. We consistently find that the pandemic-period electoral advantage of incumbent politicians in states receiving more aid substantially exceeds the more modest advantage politicians in these states enjoyed before the pandemic. This paper contributes to our understanding of economic voting and the incumbency advantage during times of crisis as well as the downstream electoral consequences of both the COVID-19 pandemic and of unequal political representation at the federal level.
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