Thirty six years to the day when US special forces captured Manuel Noriega to control the Panama Canal, Delta Force operators seized Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026 (a few hours ago) from his bunker in Venezuela’s capital Caracas.

The world’s largest oil reserves are now under American control, while Maduro is sitting in a Brooklyn detention center on narco-trafficking charges.

For the last decade, Venezuela has been the “sick man” of the Americas: a country sitting on a literal ocean of black gold, yet unable to pump it. 

Today onwards, it’s a different ball game and probably the biggest geopolitical & economic shakeup of the past 30 years.

For investors, this creates what could become this decade's most significant emerging market opportunity: a failed petrostate with more oil than any country on earth, production that’s collapsed 70% from its peak, and infrastructure that’s so degraded it needs $100 billion just to function properly again.

If the transition succeeds, early movers in Chevron and oilfield services could see 50-100% upside over three to five years. If it fails, your downside on a diversified supermajor like Chevron is perhaps 3% of revenues.

But let's not get ahead of ourselves. Between "Maduro captured" and "Venezuela pumping oil again" is a literal battlefield of civil conflict risk, infrastructure decay, and geopolitical complexity we need to navigate.

Context & consequences for global oil prices

Historical context: why Venezuela matters

Venezuela sits on 303 billion barrels of proven reserves, representing 17% of global oil. To put this in perspective: that's more than Saudi Arabia (267 billion), more than Canada (163 billion), more than Iran (209 billion).

If Venezuela were a functioning petrostate, it would be one of the wealthiest countries in the Americas.

Instead, it became a case study in resource curse economics. Under Chávez and Maduro, PDVSA (the state oil company) was systematically looted. Skilled workers were fired after the 2002-2003 strike. Infrastructure maintenance stopped. Production collapsed from 3.2 million barrels per day in the late 1990s to roughly 850,000 today, a 70% decline.

The oil itself is problematic. Venezuela's Orinoco Belt has tar sands that contain extra-heavy crude being more than double as dense as Saudi Arabian crude for example. This material is so thick it requires heating, dilution, or upgrading before it can even flow through a pipeline. 

Reaction on prices

The reaction of the oil market is currently being driven by two opposing forces: short-term fear of conflict versus long-term anticipation of supply growth.

Fear of conflict

In the days immediately following the capture, oil prices (Brent and WTI) may experience a modest “knee-jerk” spike ($1-2 per barrel). This is due to the fear of potential retaliation by loyalist military factions or damage to critical infrastructure (pipelines, ports) during the chaos. Remember, traders hate uncertainty.

However, unlike in the 90s, the U.S. is now a massive oil producer, and global markets are currently well-supplied. This creates a “ceiling” on how high prices can go, preventing a sustained 1970s-style oil shock.

The “bearish” case

Under Maduro and sanctions, production had collapsed to ~1 million barrels per day (bpd). If a US-aligned transitional government takes power, the US will likely lift sanctions on PDVSA (the state oil company) rapidly.

The return of Venezuela as a major exporter (potentially adding 1-2 million bpd over the next 3-5 years) would create a structural oversupply. This is bearish for long-term oil prices, potentially pushing them down toward $50-$55/barrel. 

This forces OPEC+ (led by Saudi Arabia and Russia) into a corner, making difficult decisions about further production cuts to maintain prices.

Consequences for the Venezuelan economy

The Venezuelan economy is currently at “year zero.” The capture of Maduro removes the primary political blockage to change but exposes the deep structural rot beneath:

Hyperinflation & currency: As in any distressed economy, the immediate aftermath of this capture will likely see a freeze in economic activity to take stock. The “black market” dollar rates will swing widely as prices for goods become untethered. A new administration would have to prioritise stabilising the ship and formalise the economy to kill this hyperinflation.


(How much money would you need to buy a chicken in local currency?)

Debt restructuring: Venezuela has been defaulting on roughly $150 billion in debt. The removal of Maduro opens the door for the IMF and World Bank to re-engage conversations. A massive debt restructuring has to be the first order of business.

Humanitarian aid: In the immediate term, the economy will shift from being in “scarcity” mode to “aid dependent” mode as basic economic & survival plumbing is rebuilt.

Part 2: Most likely scenarios

The “capture” was only the beginning. The outcome depends entirely on how the Venezuelan Armed Forces (FANB) react in the next 48-72 hours.

Scenario 1: The Panama model

(picture of Panama dictator Manuel Noriega, captured by US in 1989) (source: BBC)

Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino López cuts a deal. The military brass, facing the choice between fighting a losing war against the U.S. or negotiating their own survival, choose survival. Sanctions are lifted rapidly. Oil majors rush back in. This is the bullish case.

In Panama, GDP growth surged to 8-9% annually during 1990-1992. The country reached investment grade within 15 years. But Panama was already dollarised, had a services economy requiring minimal capital, and a population of 2.4 million. Venezuela has 28 million people, 270-370% inflation, and an oil sector requiring $100 billion in rehabilitation.

Even in the best case, we should expect 5-8 years before production approaches historical norms.

Scenario 2: Civil conflict

Hardliners like the Chavistes (from Hugo Chavez & Maduro’s factions) won’t surrender. Add to that the militants, aka the colectivos (200,000-300,000 armed Bolivarian militia members) retreat into urban guerrilla warfare. Tren de Aragua and the ELN (5,000-6,000 fighters in border regions) wage resistance and destroy infrastructure. Production falls to near zero.

This is the Iraq/Libya scenario. 

Iraq required 16 years and $50+ billion to reach 4.7 million bpd after 2003. Libya's initial recovery looked promising (1.4 million bpd by 2013 from 22,000 bpd in July 2011), but political instability crashed output to 430,000 bpd by 2014. It's still volatile today.

(image of Venezuelan Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello) (source: Bloomberg News)

Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello appeared on state TV urging mobilisation. Cuban forces (estimated 5,000-25,000 intelligence personnel) have indicated they won't engage U.S. forces directly, but they could support insurgency.

Scenario 3: Stalemate 

A government-in-exile forms under Maria Corina Machado and her endorsed candidate Edmundo Gonzalez. Legal battles ensue over legitimacy. Oil & trade sanctions remain in place. The economy stays paralysed in limbo.

This is the worst outcome for investors: no resolution, no timeline, no clarity.

Key figure to watch

(image of Venezuelan defence minister, Padrino López) (source: WION)

Padrino López now controls the military. His statement condemned the operation as "the most criminal military aggression" but notably avoided mentioning Maduro's capture. That's telling.

Trump claimed Vice President Delcy Rodríguez is "essentially willing to do what we think is necessary" following a call with Secretary of State Rubio. Rodríguez is notably NOT under U.S. indictment and has Wall Street ties. 

The US administration appears to be negotiating with regime moderates rather than backing opposition figures like María Corina Machado.

If Padrino López defects or negotiates, this ends quickly. If he fights, it gets ugly.

Winners, losers, and the playbook from Panama

The thesis

Venezuela represents a free call option on geopolitical normalisation. The asymmetric risk-reward structure is what makes this interesting.

This doesn’t look like a normal growth story, it resembles more like a bottleneck arbitrage story.

Venezuela has the reserves. It needs the capital, the expertise, and the political stability to extract them. The companies that control the chokepoints in that process will capture disproportionate value.

If there is one stock that sits at the center of this storm, it’s Chevron (CVX). Its exposure to Venezuela is best described as financially minor (3% of production) but strategically massive (potential to rise to 10% with minimal investments).

In the current context, Chevron is not “dependent” on Venezuela for its survival, but it holds the “Golden Ticket”, it is the only U.S. major with active boots on the ground, legal standing, and operational infrastructure ready to scale up immediately.

Tl;dr on Chevron:

  • Downside: Chevron loses 3% of production (already written down), oilfield services companies miss one market among many, distressed debt goes to zero
  • Upside: Chevron potentially triples Venezuelan output (from 3% to 10% of revenues), Schlumberger also arrives to rebuild and captures a top-five global market

Playbook: lessons from Panama (1989)

Drawing conclusions from the “Panama Model” provides a fascinating roadmap. The invasion of Panama led to short-term chaos but a decade of explosive growth.

For an investor in 2026 Venezuela, the lesson is: Don’t buy the “country” immediately; buy the assets the world cannot afford to let fail.

In Panama, that asset was the Canal. In Venezuela, it is the oil.

Here is a theoretical approach to play the “Reconstruction”:

Phase 1: Buying distressed assets

  • Asset: Buying Venezuelan Sovereign Debt & PDVSA Bonds.
  • Logic: It is currently trading for pennies (10-15 cents). If the US restructures the debt, a recovery to 40 cents is a 300% return.
  • Risk: Extreme. If the transition fails, these go to zero
  • Timeline: Immediate 

Phase 2: Bringing the “fixers” 

  • Asset: Schlumberger (SLB), Halliburton (HAL).
  • Logic: Venezuela’s oil isn’t like Saudi oil (which flows like water), to sell this oil, it must be heated, diluted, and “upgraded”. PDVSA’s infrastructure is rusted and broken. Companies like Schlumberger own the proprietary technology for these upgrading facilities so the new government will have to hire the “big three” global service firms to do the heavy lifting, paid for by IMF/US dollars. In a reconstruction scenario, SLB could see Venezuela become a top-5 global market within 24 months.
  • Timeline: 3-12 months

Phase 3: Privatising operators

  • Asset: Chevron (CVX), Repsol, Eni.
  • Logic: These companies already have the legal rights. They will be the primary beneficiaries of privatisation.
  • Timeline: 1-3 years

Note: Panama was already dollarised. Venezuela has a worthless currency. We’re watching closely for signs of formal dollarisation. That is the “all clear” signal for the broader economy (banks, consumer goods). Until then, it’s better to stick to energy exports.

Companies to watch

(our selection of 15 companies bound to benefit from the Venezuela shakeup)

Smaller companies to invest in

To dig further into smaller companies bound to benefit from the Venezuela shakeup, create your own StockScreener like we did:

Bonus: ETFScreener

To find out more about ETFs available to index the Venezuela shakeup, make your own ETF Screener like we did:

Our take

Venezuela represents the purest form of geopolitical optionality available in public markets today. The world's largest oil reserves just had their political blockage removed. 

The question is whether the new reality permits the $100 billion in capital required to rebuild 30 years of deteriorated infrastructure.

We’re cautiously constructive, with a heavy emphasis on "cautiously."

Chevron's first-mover advantage is extraordinary: legal standing, operational infrastructure, and boots on the ground while every competitor starts from zero. SLB's technology position in heavy oil upgrading is similarly differentiated. The distressed debt offers significant upside if restructuring proceeds.

But the risks are equally real. The probability of civil conflict is nearly 75%. Infrastructure sabotage could set recovery back years, and a political stalemate could leave the country in limbo indefinitely.

Our outlook:

Near-term (0-6 months): No new direct commitments. Watch for FANB alignment with transition, colectivo demobilisation, and infrastructure security stabilisation. The next 72 hours are critical.

Medium-term (6-24 months): If political stability emerges, begin building positions in CVX and SLB. These names offer leveraged upside to Venezuelan normalisation with diversified downside protection from global operations.

Long-term (24+ months): If formal dollarisation occurs and the transition government gains legitimacy, the distressed debt play crystallises. Consider specialist EM credit funds with Venezuela restructuring exposure.

Panama gives us pointers to look out for. It recovered in 5-8 years with a services economy. Iraq and Libya took 10-15+ years for resource sectors. Venezuela's trajectory will follow the latter. Any investor returns require similar patience.

https://www.marketscreener.com/news/venezuela-panama-2-0-how-to-play-the-reconstruction-of-a-failed-state-ce7e59d9d180fe22