Mojtaba Khamenei’s continued absence from public view has created an unusual system of authority in Tehran, where decisions are made and justified through written messages attributed to him while responsibility appears dispersed across a core establishment network.
With no public appearance or clear final word from Khamenei, competing figures can interpret his intentions differently, and those with the greatest institutional and military power are best placed to turn their interpretation into policy.
Khamenei has been absent from major political and personal events since becoming supreme leader, including the funeral of his wife and the extensive ceremonies marking his father’s death.
His disappearance has produced contradictory accounts about his condition, ranging from claims that he is in good health to reports of injuries or even the loss of a limb.
Officials and media close to the establishment have meanwhile cited extraordinary security precautions to explain why neither his image nor his voice has been released.
‘In principle’
Whatever the security rationale, Iranians have little means of assessing the new leader’s condition, capabilities or views for themselves. Instead, they encounter him largely through written statements and officials explaining what he means.
The clearest example came in a message attributed to Khamenei concerning negotiations and the memorandum of understanding with the United States.
He allowed President Masoud Pezeshkian to take responsibility for negotiations and effectively permitted the agreement to be signed, while saying that “in principle” he had held a different view.
Those two words immediately became a matter of political interpretation.
The IRGC’s political deputy rejected suggestions that they meant Khamenei fundamentally opposed negotiations. “This interpretation is incorrect and does not correspond with the existing realities,” he said.
But a military adviser to Khamenei offered a different reading: “When the Leader says, ‘in principle, I held a different view,’ it means the path that Agha had in mind was better than the path taken by the Supreme National Security Council.”
The same message could therefore be presented as permission for diplomacy or evidence of reservations about it, with figures claiming proximity to Khamenei effectively speaking on his behalf.
Speaking for the leader
The same process is helping construct Khamenei’s image as a wartime leader.
Ebrahim Jabbari, an adviser to the IRGC commander, has spoken of Khamenei’s “command and mastery” of military affairs and his management of expert meetings of the armed forces.
Supporters have also promoted the slogan “Khamenei has become young again,” presenting the succession as a renewal of leadership during war.
Such accounts give the military and security establishment an important role not merely in implementing the supreme leader’s decisions but in explaining his character, capabilities and intentions to the public.
Foreign leaders have inadvertently reinforced his position. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly said Khamenei is alive, while US President Donald Trump has described him as “definitely and 100 percent” involved in negotiations between Tehran and Washington and even raised the possibility of meeting him.
Khamenei is thus presented by his subordinates as directing military affairs and confronting Iran’s enemies, while those same enemies publicly treat him as the ultimate decision-maker — even as he remains absent from public view.
Who decides?
That absence becomes more consequential as Iran confronts the choice between continued confrontation and diplomacy.
Khamenei has apparently authorized negotiations and the signing of an agreement, but messages attributed to him have also promised vengeance. Officials advocating different courses can therefore claim to be acting in accordance with the same leader.
Iran’s military and security institutions possess both the organizational power to act during wartime and an extensive presence in the state’s decision-making and media structures.
When Khamenei’s wishes are unclear, those institutions are better positioned than advocates of compromise to determine how they are translated into policy.
Majid Mousavi, commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, has called on others to follow the supreme leader’s wishes as his forces carry much of the burden of the current war. Yet precisely what those wishes are remains unclear.
Policy instead emerges through written messages, competing interpretations and repeated invocations of the leader’s authority. Successes can be attributed to his leadership, while responsibility for costly decisions and their consequences is spread across a wider network.
The less Iranians see or hear from Mojtaba Khamenei, the more they must rely on others to tell them what he thinks. As the country weighs war against diplomacy, the question is increasingly not simply what Iran’s supreme leader wants, but who gets to decide what his wishes mean.
