by Hamid Enayat
The Iranian regime is trying to turn the Strait of Hormuz into what its nuclear program once provided: a permanent source of pressure on the United States and its allies. The regime is holding the world’s energy supply hostage to distract attention from its repression and executions inside Iran.
Tehran is not concealing its intention. On Aug. 5, an editorial published on Ali Khamenei’s official website described the Strait of Hormuz as the “pillar of Iran’s new security order.” It declared that the waterway would not be a temporary bargaining chip and would never return to its prewar condition. The message to Washington is unmistakable: The regime intends to use control over a vital artery of the global economy to extract concessions, deter pressure and guarantee its own survival.
That doctrine creates a threat far larger than a temporary interruption in oil shipments. Even when tankers move, insurers, shipping companies and commodity markets must price in the possibility that Tehran will close the gate again. The resulting premium reaches American families through fuel, transportation, fertilizer, food and manufactured goods. Iran does not need to stop every ship to impose costs. It needs only to preserve uncertainty—and demonstrate that every future confrontation can become an economic emergency for the West.
The United States must protect freedom of navigation. Naval escorts, mine-clearing operations and credible deterrence are necessary to prevent the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from converting an international waterway into sovereign property. But military power alone cannot eliminate the regime’s incentive to manufacture crises. A protected tanker is not the same thing as a durable strategy.
Iran’s rulers have survived for decades by turning foreign confrontation into domestic control. External threats allow them to militarize society, brand dissent as treason and justify executions in the name of national security. A June 27 editorial on Khamenei’s website called the “continuation of the war” an organizing principle for Iran’s economic, media, social and political life. This is why another round of strikes, however tactically successful, cannot by itself produce political change. It may damage the regime’s capabilities while strengthening the state of emergency on which its repression depends.
Appeasement has failed for the opposite reason. Successive Western governments treated concessions and limited agreements as a path to moderation while executions, terrorism abroad and support for proxy forces continued. Each temporary arrangement taught Tehran that escalation works. When one instrument of coercion was weakened, the regime built another. Nuclear enrichment, regional militias and now the Strait of Hormuz are not separate problems. They are successive tools of the same survival strategy.
Washington therefore faces more than the familiar choice between accommodation and war. Iran is not simply a regime to be bargained with or a target to be bombed. It is also a nation whose people have repeatedly demonstrated their determination to overthrow religious dictatorship and establish a representative government. A sound American strategy should place that internal struggle—not another foreign intervention—at the center of its policy.
There is civilian resistance inside Iran, calling for a democratic and secular republic, free elections, equality between women and men, a nonnuclear Iran, and peaceful relations with neighboring countries. These principles are the opposite of a regime that derives power from hostage-taking, proxy warfare, and threats to energy routes. Recognizing the Iranian people’s right to resist dictatorship is not the same as choosing their future leaders. It means acknowledging that legitimate political change must come from within Iran—and that those risking their lives for it should not be ignored.
The United States can support that path without deploying troops or imposing collective punishment. It should expand secure internet access, expose and sanction officials responsible for executions, hold the Revolutionary Guard accountable for terrorism and repression, and give political recognition to the Iranian people’s right to overthrow dictatorship. Targeted pressure should weaken the apparatus of repression.
Such a policy would reinforce, not replace, American deterrence. Tehran must know that it cannot close an international waterway without consequences. But it must also know that manufacturing another crisis will no longer persuade Washington to overlook repression at home or bargain away the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people.
The Hormuz crisis did not originate in the water. It began in Tehran, where a regime without democratic legitimacy requires permanent confrontation to survive. Keeping the strait open is an urgent military and economic necessity. Preventing the next crisis requires a political strategy: reject both appeasement and foreign-imposed regime change, and support a democratic transition led by Iranians themselves. Only then can Washington break the cycle in which every weakened threat is replaced by a more dangerous one.
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