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Saturday, October 17, 2026

Who are the Baluch militants taking on Iran rulers, and how far can they go?

 Awave of deadly attacks on Iranian security forces in the country’s restive southeast has brought renewed attention to a coalition of Baluch militants seeking to broaden their fight against the Islamic Republic, raising questions about how far the insurgency can spread.

The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency, HRANA, documented 63 armed incidents across southeastern Iran between March 31 and October 10, with at least 94 people killed and 33 wounded, according to local and unofficial reports.

On October 7 and 8, at least five Iranian military and police personnel were killed and several others wounded in four armed attacks within 24 hours, local rights group Haalvsh reported. On October 14, a women’s Basij commander and a police officer were killed in separate attacks in Mehrastan County.

The People’s Fighters Front, known by its Persian initials JMM, has claimed responsibility for at least six attacks. Most of the incidents documented by HRANA remained unattributed or could not reliably be linked to a particular group.

JMM was formed in December 2025 through the merger of several factions, including Jaish al-Adl, a militant group that emerged around 2012 following the dismantling of Jundallah and Iran’s execution of its leader, Abdolmalek Rigi.

The United States designated Jundallah as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2010, amending both designations in 2019 to include Jaish al-Adl as an alias. Iran also designates Jaish al-Adl a terrorist organization.

What is the People’s Fighters Front?

The coalition brings together Jaish al-Adl, the PADA Baluch Movement, Harakat-e Nasr Baluchistan, the Mohammad Rasulullah group and fighters described in its charter as independently organized Baluch combatants.

Jundallah leader Abdolmalek Rigi following his arrest by Iranian authorities on February 23, 2010.

The coalition’s charter describes PADA Baluch as a cultural movement focused on Baluch identity, while other members have explicitly military or religious origins. Harakat-e Nasr, for example, says it was founded to avenge the death of a Sunni cleric.

The front says its formation followed lengthy negotiations to improve coordination and broaden a struggle previously pursued through what its charter calls traditional and rudimentary approaches.

It advocates political, diplomatic, cultural and media activity alongside what it describes as legitimate defense. Its ultimate objective, the charter says, is “deep political changes in Iran.”

Why has the fighting intensified?

Farzin Nadimi, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, told Iran International that the merger had helped the militants step up their campaign and adopt more destructive tactics, with attacks becoming more frequent particularly in September and October.

The coalition was seeking to build a broader front against Tehran and connect its campaign to the protest movement that emerged in January, exploiting opportunities presented by protests and war, he said.

“We are seeing some more advanced tactics used,” Nadimi said.

Nadimi said the militants had not yet developed the capability to seize territory, though he believed they were moving toward that level of insurgency.

HRANA reported greater use of mines, rocket-propelled grenades and other heavier weapons, alongside the deployment of drones, artillery and armored vehicles by government forces. Attacks on patrols and military convoys were the most common incidents it recorded, followed by targeted shootings.

The region has experienced major attacks for years. Jaish al-Adl claimed a 2019 suicide bombing that killed 27 Revolutionary Guards and a December 2023 attack that killed 11 security personnel in Rask. Coordinated attacks in Rask and Chabahar followed in April 2024.

Baluch activist and journalist Khalilullah Balochi argues that the groups’ capabilities predate their merger and that earlier restraint reflected their assessment of public interests.

“The activities of these groups are not new; what is new is the intensification of attacks,” he told Iran International.

He attributes armed mobilization primarily to economic deprivation, ethnic and religious discrimination and repression, arguing that militarization has deepened the grievances driving recruitment.

The recent fighting also involves armed actors whose affiliations remain unclear.

On October 13, the Revolutionary Guards said five members of an alleged kidnapping cell and one IRGC member were killed during an operation near Zahedan. The Guards said a kidnapped engineer was rescued, without naming the armed group involved.

Separately, Haalvsh reported that more than 20 members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, an Afghan fighting force operating under the IRGC’s Quds Force, were killed or wounded during prolonged fighting in Taftan County that day.

Can JMM build a nationwide movement?

JMM’s founding documents combine demands for Baluch rights with appeals for nationwide cooperation against Iran’s clerical rulers.

In its founding video, released alongside its charter in December 2025, masked spokesman Mahmoud Baluch appeals to communities across Iran and describes the country’s resources as captive to the system of velayat-e faqih, or rule by an Islamic jurist.

“The People’s Fighters Front wants an Iran for all Iranians,” he says. The charter identifies religious and cultural beliefs as part of the front’s identity, invoking Islamic principles and describing sacrifice for God’s approval.

A recent statement by JMM calls Iran “our dear homeland” and anticipates the “great nation of Iran” uniting against the ruling system.

The coalition describes its operations as defensive. Its charter says they aim to hold the government accountable for repression and remove obstacles to popular demands.

Political analyst Mehdi Nakhl-Ahmadi told Iran International that Jaish al-Adl’s emphasis on ethnic and religious demands and armed struggle had limited its ability to attract wider public support and cooperate with other opposition groups.

The new front’s national objectives and embrace of political, civil and media activity alongside armed struggle could reflect a strategic shift or a tactical effort to overcome those limitations and gain broader acceptance, he said.

However, he cautioned, changing its charter and political language would not necessarily translate into achieving those objectives.

The experience of Iranian Kurdish parties showed that even movements with long political histories and efforts at coalition-building faced a complex, lengthy process in building lasting cooperation and a nationwide support base, he said.

Whether JMM could broaden its reach would depend on other political groups’ willingness to engage and the front’s ability to build trust and cooperation, he said.

Fate of Baluch civilians

Nadimi expects continued counterinsurgency operations, potentially including more forces and Basij personnel, village raids and public executions. He warned that Baluch civilians would continue to face deaths and detentions, while inadequate services would compound anger toward the government.

Balochi argues that armed resistance could restrain the authorities by raising the cost of repression. He believes crackdowns have encouraged recruitment and that the government increasingly recognizes force alone cannot deter the militants.

“In fact, the most effective factor capable of restraining the Islamic Republic’s behavior is the military activities of this very group,” he said.

Are Iran’s neighbors involved?

Tehran has pressed its neighbors to curb armed groups operating along its eastern borders. Ebrahim Azizi, chairman of parliament’s national security and foreign policy commission, accused Pakistan and Afghanistan of leaving their borders unattended and urged stronger diplomatic engagement.

Balochi identifies neighboring governments’ policies as decisive, arguing that the groups could expand if countries hosting them refrain from tightening restrictions.

Iranian authorities also frequently allege foreign involvement in the violence. Tasnim attributed the October 14 killing of the women’s Basij commander to militants linked to the United States and Israel, without providing evidence.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei blamed US and Israeli plans for insecurity along Iran’s borders when asked about allegations that regional countries, including the United Arab Emirates, might be assisting armed groups.

Beyond border security, Nadimi warns that the insurgency could become intertwined with the wider war.

“If it continues to increase in intensity and geographical reach, the two could very well intertwine,” he said.

https://www.iranintl.com/en/202610152591

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